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EXPERT TESTIMONY IN MISSOURI ON POINT OF IMPACT IN
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
Most automobile accidents present no peculiar or unusual problems for the
practitioner in establishing fault and liability. There are some cases, however, that
demand of the advocate a great deal of skill and hard work to make out a case
of negligence. One of the types of cases that fit into this latter category are divider
line collisions between two automobiles. The ultimate issue usually boils down to
which driver was on the wrong side of the road at the time of the collision.
All too often testimonal proof in these type accidents is either completely lacking1 or subject to enormous credibility problems. Conflicts appear in the testimony
of witnesses and many times in the testimony given by the same witness. To
compound this problem, often the only witnesses to the accident are the
interested litigants 2 To surmount these problems, the lawyer must turn to the
physical evidence left in the wake of an automobile collision.
The physical evidence is used in an attempt to reconstruct the accident for
the court or jury, and the attorney will find that he can nearly always place before
the jury the physical facts on which the reconstruction is to be based and can argue
the implications arising therefrom by way of summation. In many of these cases the
investigating police officer is used as a witness to testify as to the physical facts.3
He is usually in the best position to relate the physical evidence, having observed
and noted the skid marks, debris, damage, and location of the vehicles involved.
However, permitting the investigating officer or other expert to go further
and testify as to the significance of the physical evidence is quite another matter.
There are certain well recognized areas on which an expert is permitted to testify
and there are other areas that are the subject of a great deal of controversy.
It is quite generally accepted in Missouri and in other jurisdictions that the
determination of speed from the length of skid marks is an appropriate subject
for expert testimony.4 The Missouri court states:
While we have found no case in this state passing directly on the question,
certainly the general weight of authority in this country recognizes that a
witness qualified as an expert may give his opinion, based upon the length
of the skid marks and other pertinent data as to the minimum speed at
the time the brakes were applied of a motor vehicle involved in an accident 5

1. Williams v. Cavender, 378 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. 1964). In this case both
drivers were killed and there were no other witnesses to the collision.
2. Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. En Bane 1967).
3. Zelayeta v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 104 Cal. App.2d 716, 232 P.2d 572
(1951); Hamre v. Conger, 357 Mo. 497, 209 S.W.2d 242 (1948).
4. Dillenschneider v. Campbell, 350 S.W.2d 260 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961);
see Annot. 23 A.L.R.2d 112 (1952).
5. Dillenschneider v. Campbell, 350 S.W.2d 260, 266-267 (K.C. Mo. App.
1961).
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The corollary of this type testimony, determining the stopping distance of a
car going a certain speed, is also generally accepted as a proper subject for expert
testimony.0 In Missouri, as well as in other states, this determination is often so
well accepted that the courts will take judicial notice of stopping distances. 7 Other
areas where the court will take judicial notice, are reaction times, and average
walking speed of pedestrians.8 In Leap v. Gangelkoff,9 the court accepted without
comment the testimony of an expert regarding reaction time and walking speed.
Apparently these are areas where the court deems the matter under consideration
both so technical that an expert is allowed to testify, and of such common knowledge that the court in other cases will take judicial notice of the fact. Experts have
0
also been allowed to testify as to the turning radius of a vehicle at a certain speed,'
and also as the mechanics of a truck's steering gear and the truck's behavioral
pattern should the mechanism fail in a particular way."
The courts are reluctant, however, to allow an expert to estimate speed from
the damage done to the vehicles.' 2 While this issue generally arises in connection
with the admissibility of some other form of evidence,' 3 such evidence is generally
excluded, most commonly because there was no sufficient showing that the witness
in question was qualified as an expert to draw the necessary conclusion. In those
cases where such evidence was admitted, the expert was usually shown to have a
14
high degree of qualification in the field of accident reconstruction.
Another area of reconstruction evidence that is generally held admissible is
experimental evidence. The trial court is given a wide latitude 6f discretion, and
will not be reversed on appeal unless abuse is shown. Although these cases do not
16
always require an expert,15 where one is used the evidence is usually admissible.
Perhaps the most controversial area of admissibility of expert testimony in
accident reconstruction is point of impact evidence. The Missouri Supreme Court
17
in a recent case had the opportunity to re-examine its position in this area. The
case considered involved a collision on a road with an unmarked center-line. The
accident occurred as the defendant, driving his heavily loaded station wagon east,
6. Ibid.
7. Immekus v. Quigg, 406 S.W.2d 298 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966); see Annot.
84 A.L.R.2d 979 (1962); De Lay v. Ward, 364 Mo. 431, 432-443, 262 S.W.2d 628,
630-638 (1953).
8. Immekus v. Quigg, 406 S.W.2d 298 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966); Losh v. Benton,
382 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1964).
9. 416 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967).
10. Yocum v. Kansas City Pub. Ser. Co., 349 S.W.2d 860 (Mo. 1961).
11. Central & Southern Truck Lines v. Westfall G.M.C. Truck, 317 S.W.2d
841 (K.C. Mo. App. 1958).
12. Dillenschneider v. Campbell, 350 S.W.2d 260, 267 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961);
see Annot. 93 A.L.R.2d 287 (1964).
13. Dillenschneider v. Campbell, 350 S.W.2d 260 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961).
14. Foreman v. Heinz, 185 Kan. 758, 347 P.2d 451 (1959); Johnson v.
Huskey, 186 Kan. 282, 350 P.2d 14 (1960); Continental Oil Co. v. Elias, 307
P.2d 849 (Okla. 1956).
15. Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959).
16. Sullivan v. Hanley, 347 S.W.2d 710 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961).
17. Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
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entered a downhill curve to his right. The plaintiff was driving west and proceeding
up the hill. The only question in the case was which vehicle was on the wrong
side of the road at the time of the collision.18
The plaintiff introduced the testimony of a well recognized expert in the field
of automobile accident reconstruction. 19 His qualifications were unchallenged and
defendant's counsel conceded in argument the position of importance of the expert
and referred to him as highly qualified. On appeal the court stated:
Nor are his conclusions and opinions challenged as far as accuracy and
truth are concerned. The question is one of admissibility of expert testi20
mony.
The expert was informed of the makes of the automobiles, their directions,
and their speeds as testified to by their drivers. He examined the available photographs taken by the parties and inspected the scene of the accident some ten
months after the event. Using this information, the principles of dynamics and
momentum, and his experience in automobile accident reconstruction, he testified
as to his conclusions.
He explained that during maximum engagement of two colliding automobiles,
there is an unusually large downward force on the front wheels and that physical
signs known as "scrub marks" are often left by the front tires as a result of the heat,
weight and friction. Examining photographs of the accident, he identified one of
the several black marks shown as a scrub mark. He explained the identifying
characteristics of scrub marks as distinguished from ordinary skid marks.
Noting that the major accumulation of debris was east of the scrub mark and
point of maximum engagement, he explained the phenomenon that he had observed
in experimental crashes of debris being located at some point other than the area
of initial impact. He stated that the debris, loosened by impact, will continue to
move in the direction of the car from which it had its origin until it meets a superior force such as defendant's automobile and is batted back in the opposite direction
before it reaches the ground.
18. Id. at 286.
19. The court in Housman lists the accomplishments and qualifications of
the expert by saying at page 286: "J. Stannard Baker is Director of Research and
Development at the Traffic Institute of Northwestern University. A traffic engineer, he directs the major part of the research and development work at the
institute. Educated as an electrical engineer, he was on the staff of the National
Safety Council 1928-1945 and director of safety for the transit lines in Detroit one
year. He has been associated at times with the institute since its founding in
1936. For 30 years he has observed, supervised and studied crashes of motor
vehicles under controlled conditions. He teaches traffic reconstruction. He has
written texts, manuals, guides, articles and books by the hundreds in this field.
He invented devices to calculate speed of vehicles from skid marks. He has testified approximately 200 times in court as an expert. He received various awards
for distinguished service and research in highway safety. He is proficient in the
science of photogrammetry (making maps from photographs) and wrote a manual
on the subject under a government grant."
20. Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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Using a technique known as photogrammetry (making maps from photographs), he prepared an overlay of the road and on it pinpointed the location
of the scrub mark. He also identified and located another skid mark as the mark
left by the skidding rear wheel of the defendant's station wagon after impact.
The trial court then refused to allow the expert to reconstruct to scale the positions of the automobiles with respect to each other and with respect to the
road. The witness explained away other skid marks shown in the photographs
as not being related to this accident, but was not allowed to illustrate the positions of the vehicles in stages from the time of initial contact until they came
to rest, for the assigned reason that this would usurp the function of the jury.
The court sitting en banc decided to ignore the trend of recent decisions
21
and stay with the long line of
on the subject of point of impact testimony
22
Missouri decisions on this point. The Missouri case law on this subject got its
23
start in some unfortunate dictum in Hamre v. Conger where after pointing out
that the witness, a highway patrolman had not been shown to be sufficiently
qualified, the court went further and stated that point of impact is not a proper
subject for expert testimony.
The Missouri court, as well as many others, confuses the opinion: rule and
the rule on expert testimony. For instance, in the decision in Housman v. Fiddyment,24 the court cited earlier Missouri cases and adopted what it believed to
be the rule:
Allowing an expert to give an opinion upon a subject of inquiry, instead of requiring that the witness give only facts, is an exception to
25
the rule that witnesses must state facts.
Wigmore in his classic treatise, recognizes the confusion and emphasizes the need
to distinguish: "[Tlhus it is essential that the doctrine of Experimental Qualifications should not be confounded with the doctrine of superfluous Opinion evidence." ' 26 He goes on to say: "The whole law of 'opinion evidence,' so called,
may be and might well be modified or abolished; but that would not affect in
27
To help, he
the slightest the sound doctrine of experiential qualifications."
suggests two tests:
[fjirst, [I]s this a matter upon which this witness is sufficiently
qualified by experience? and if it is, next, Is this a matter upon which
21. Een v. Consolidated Freightways, 120 Supp. 289 (D.N.D. 1954); Wells
Truckways v. Cebrian, 122 Cal. App.2d 666, 265 P.2d 557 (1954); Ison v. Stewart,
105 Colo. 55, 94 P.2d 701 (1939); Brower v- Quick, 249 Ia. 569, 88 N.W.2d 120
(1958); Mann's Ex'r v. Leyman Motor Co., 234 Ky. 639, 28 S.W.2d 956 (1930);
Tuck v. Buller, 311 P.2d 212 (Okla. 1957); Henthom v. M.G.C. Corp., 1 Wis.2d
180, 83 N.W.2d 759 (1957); see Annot. 66 A.L.R.2d 1048 (1959).
22. See the discussion of the Missouri cases in the text of this article infra.
23. 357 Mo. 497, 209 S.W.2d 242 (1948).
24. 421 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
25. Id. at 289.
26. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 557 (3rd Ed. 1940).

27. Ibid.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/6
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the jury are or may be so well furnished
with information that this wit28
ness cannot help them appreciably?
Using Wigmore's test on the evidence presented in this case, it is apparent
that the first requirement is met; in fact, it is admitted. The second requirement
asks if the witness can help the jury, if he can, then he should be permitted to
testify. Wigmore makes no reference to expect testimony being objectionable
because it is directed at the ultimate issue or issues to be decided by the jury.
A more contemporary source is the Uniform Rules of Evidence which would
cast the opinion rule and the rule on expert testimony in the following manner:
Rule 56. Testimony in Form of Opinion.-(1) If the witness is
not testifying as an expert his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to such opinions or inferences as the judge finds (a)
may be rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) are
helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or to the determination
of the fact in issue.
(2) If the witness is testifying as an expert, testimony of the witness in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to such opinions as
the judge finds are (a) based on facts or data perceived by or personally
known or made known to the witness at the hearing and (b) within the
scope of the special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by
the witness.
(3) Unless the judge excludes the testimony he shall be deemed to
have made the finding requisite to its admission.
(4) Testimony in the form of opinions or inferences otherwise admissible under these rules is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue or issues to be decided by the trier of the fact.29
The qualifications of the witness can be based upon experience, observation,
or knowledge. These may stem from long exposure to the subject under inquiry through job experience, special training or from some other source. The
party offering the expert must demonstrate his special qualifications to the
trial court and the trial court should be left to determine "absolutely and
without review, the fact of possession of the required qualifications by a particular witness."' 30 The difficulty of the particular problem often enters into
the competency of a witness to testify and is best understood by the trial judge
alone. Emphasizing this judicial discretion, Wigmore states that there is an
ample safeguard in cross examination to reveal the qualifications of the witness, and states that it is an injustice to require supreme court justices to
investigate such trifles.3 1
Once the qualifications of the witness have been established, emphasis
should be directed at the issue of whether the expert can aid the jury, taking
28. Ibid.
29. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 56.
30. 2 WIGMOE, EVIDENCE § 561 (3rd Ed. 1940).
31. Ibid.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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into consideration, the facts of the particular case. Emphasis should not be
placed on an area of exclusion as the court did in Housman. 32 The opinion in that
case leaves little question on the admissibility of point of impact testimony in
Missouri. To say that in every case involving point of impact, highly qualified
expert testimony is inadmissible, states a rule that is much too rigid in its
application.
In some highly persuasive reasoning, a California court stated:
Thus, expert testimony is admissible or not dependent upon whether the
subject matter is within common experience or whether it is a special field
where the opinion of one of skill and experience will be of greater validity
than that of the ordinary juryman. It is quite obvious that the conclusion,
based upon the facts of the particular case, as to just where a collision between two vehicles occurred, may be so obvious that any reasonable person, trained or not, can draw that inference from the facts. It is equally
clear that cases may occur where the opinions of trained experts in the field
on this subject will be of great assistance to the members of the jury in arriving at their conclusions. In such cases a traffic officer who has spent
years investigating accidents in which he has been required to render official reports not only as to the facts of the accidents but also as to his
opinion as to their causes, including his opinion, where necessary, as to the
point of impact, is an expert. Necessarily, in this field, much must be left
to the common sense and discretion of the trial court 38
In Ben v. Consolidated Freightways,3 4 a leading case on point of impact testimony, the federal court states:
In the case at hand, contrary inferences as to which side of the road the
accident occurred on were earnestly argued by opposing counsel from the
physical facts existing immediately after the accident. It would seem,
therefore, that this is not a case where the conclusion as to where the collision occurred is so obvious that any reasonable person, trained or not,
could easily draw the inference. Rather, it would seem to be a case where
trained experts in the field would be of considerable assistance to the jurors
in arriving at their conclusions 3 5
In contrast, the Missouri court found that the testimony of the expert in
Housman added nothing to the jury's knowledge and found his testimony as to
the point of maximum engagement "particularly prejudicial"38 when he located
the scrub mark to be one and one-half feet into plaintiff's lane.
The court places heavy reliance on the uniform rulings of the Missouri courts
in earlier decisions. In Homan v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,37 there was a collision between a bus and a railroad car. The court ruled that it was not error on the part
32. 421 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
33. Zelayeta v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 104 Cal. App. 2d 716, 726-727,
232 P.2d 572, 579 (1951).
34. 120 F. Supp. 289 (D. N.D. 1954).
35. Id. at 293.
36. 421 S.W.2d at 290.
37. 334 Mo. 61, 64 S.W.2d 617 (En Banc 1933).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/6
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of the trial court to exclude the testimony of automobile repairmen as to the position of the bus and flatcar at the time of the collision. The court stated that the
nature and location of the damage to the flatcar and bus and their relative positions
at the moment of the collision were not matters of an "unusual, complicated, or
technical nature."3 8 Citing other authority for the point, the court states, that one
test of the admissibility of such evidence is "whether the court or jury will be aided
by receiving the evidence." 3 9 The exclusion of the evidence in this case does not
seem at all unreasonable in view of the number of eyewitnesses available, and the
qualifications of the "experts." In a later case brought by the husband of the plaintiff in the Homan case discussed above, the court reiterated its earlier decision on
the subject as controlling and refused to allow an automobile dealer and repair
40
shop operator to testify.
The next case decided on this issue involved the testimony of a highway patrol
sergeant who testified that certain damage to a truck was caused by "an object
going in the opposite direction." 41 The court refused to reverse the case on this
ground because the evidence was not prejudicial.
Then in Hamre v. Conger,42 which the court in Housman cited so approvingly,
there was an intersectional collision between a truck and a car, and a highway
patrolman testified for the plaintiff as to the location of dirt, glass and other debris.
He went on to state that in his opinion, the point of impact was at the center of
the debris. The court found that the witness was not properly qualified and then
went on to say:
Whatever value the location of the debris or the center of the debris falling from two motor vehicles upon impact may have upon determining the
point of impact is not, in our opinion, a proper subject for expert or
opinion evidence 48
This statement is the origin of the broad exclusionary rule propounded by the
court in Housman. Where an expert's opinion is based solely on locating the heaviest
concentration of debris and placing the point of impact there, then it may be a
matter on which the average juror would be as competent as any expert, and it is
indeed questionable whether an expert could appreciably aid the court or jury.
However, if it is true, as the expert in Housman testified, that debris does not fall
immediately from colliding autos, but tends to be carried or batted back in the
direction of movement of the car with larger momentum, then it seems highly
probable that the testimony of an expert having supervised and conducted many
experimental crashes would aid a jury in fixing the location of initial impact. Although the court in Hamre talks about excluding expert testimony on this point,
38.
39.
40.
41.
(1941).
42.
43.

Id. at 79, 64 S.W.2d at 625.
Ibid.
335 Mo. 30, 70 S.W.2d 869 (1934).
Cornwell v. Highway Motor Freight Line, 348 Mo. 19, 152 S.W.2d 10
357 Mo. 497, 209 S.W.2d 242 (1948).
Id. at 507, 209 S.W.2d at 249.
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its decision was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the "expert" in that case
was a highway patrolman and probably not as well qualified as the expert in
Housman.
In later cases, the courts agreed with Hamre, but found no prejudicial error
in admitting the testimony of highway patrolmen as to the point of impact. In the
case of Cox v. Wrinkle, 44 the patrolman's testimony was in fact favorable to the
objecting party. In like manner, the court in Welch v. McNeely,4 5 found the
answer of a witness unresponsive and therefore not prejudicial, when in answer to
a question regarding his opinion as to the point of impact, the witness stated the
location of the greatest concentration of debris.
Chester v. Shockley, 46 the next case in the series of decisions, involved the
testimony of a police officer who stated that by considering the location of the dirt,
the point at which the skid marks changed direction and where they ended, he had
determined what he thought was the point of impact. The court found error in admitting the policeman's testimony and gave no reasons for its refusal to allow the
evidence; it merely cited the foregoing authorities as a basis for its decision. 47
In Duncan v. Pinkston,4s the court found error in the admission into evidence
of the testimony of a highway patrolman based on the location of debris as to the
point of impact. The court stated:
Such evidence has been held to be improper as not being a proper subject
of expert or opinion evidence and as invading the province of the jury.49
It has become well recognized that "invading the province of jury" is -not an objection well taken. Numerous Missouri cases have so held, 50 and they are supported
by cited and respected authorities.51 That objection had its origin in the opinion
rule which itself is under bombardment by legal authorities and writers in the
field.

52

As the Missouri court in State v. Paglno5U has stated:
The province of the jury is to hear all of the evidence including opinion
evidence, to weigh it all, and to decide the issues. Thus an opinion (evi44. 267 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1954).
45. 269 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. 1954).
46. 304 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. 1957).
47. In Ryan v. Campbell "66" Express, Inc., 304 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. En Banc
1957) the court again recognized the decisions in Missouri on point of impact but
chose not to elaborate on the point.
48. 340 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1960).
49. Id. at 758.
50. State v. Paglino, 319 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. 1958); State v. Cochran, 356
Mo. 778, 203 S.W.2d 707 (1947); State v. Brown, 291 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. 1956);
Central & Southern Truck Lines, Inc. v. Westfall GMC Truck, Inc., 317 S.W.2d
841 (K.C. Mo. App. 1958).
51. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1920 (3rd Ed. 1940).
52. See McCormick, Some Observations Upon the Opinion Rile and Expert
Testimony, 23 TEXAs LAw REv. 109, 110 (1945).
53. 319 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. 1958).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/6
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dence) cannot 'invade the province of a jury,' and this (is true), even
though the opinion is upon the very issue to be decided. An objection that
an expert opinion invades the province of the jury is not a valid one. 4
In Williams v. Cavender,5 5 there was a divider line collision between two automobiles. Both of the drivers died as a result of the collision and there were no other
eyewitnesses to the tragedy. The only witness of any real consequence was the
highway patrolman who investigated the accident, having arrived on the scene
some twenty minutes after the accident. The need for a well qualified expert witness is dramatically represented here. The skid marks, debris and location of the
damaged vehicles were silent witnesses to the collision. In the hands of a highly
trained specialist in the field, these pieces to the jigsaw puzzle could have been arranged into a very meaningful picture of the accident. The court displays its reluctance to decide the case by saying:
It is always unfortunate when we are forced to determine the merits of a
case upon such meager and strictly circumstantial evidence as we have
here.50
The court refused to find the testimony of the patrol officer prejudicial because
the objecting party had elicited the same testimony on his direct examination.
However, the court was careful not to disturb the prior point of impact decisions
in Missouri.
In reaching its decision, the court in Williams, very carefully analyzed the
physical evidence. Nevertheless, after the analysis, the court was forced to admit
that it could not explain the nineteen-foot arcing skid that led to the front wheel
of one of the automobiles. In an attempt to justify its lack of explanation, the court
stated:
We do not feel that the movement of that car after the actual impact is
of any great importance, for it could have little relation to the car's movements prior to impact.0 7
It is submitted that the movement of an automobile after a collision is very closely
connected to the speed, direction, and location that it has both prior to the collision
and at the time of impact. It would seem that the aid of a properly trained and
qualified expert would have been of some assistance in this case.
On the basis of the foregoing decisions the court in Housman concluded that
it was prejudicial error to admit the testimony of the expert because the ultimate
issue for decision (point of impact) "was within the ken and competence of the
58
average juror."
The testimony of an expert is admissible because his professional pursuit, or
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 623.
378 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. 1964).
Id. at 540.
Id. at 542.
421 S.W.2d at 292.
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his peculiar skill or knowledge allows him to draw an inference where men of common experience would be left to doubt. No definitive line can be drawn between
matters of common knowledge and those requiring expertise, and for this reason
the matter is better left to the discretion of the trial court, which best understands
the facts and circumstances of the evidence.
Very commonly an expression of opinion by an expert is broad enough that
the court or jury might adopt it as a basis for the ultimate decision in the case.
However, this does not mean that the witness is deciding the case or that in so
testifying he is usurping the functions of the jury. He is merely giving an opinion
based upon his skill or training, which the court or jury may or may not accept
as testimony that will lead to a disposition of the case. The jury is at liberty to
reject the testimony and as a further safeguard can be instructed on this point.
In most automobile accidents, the evidence is not self-explanatory to the layman. It seems much more reasonable to get to the truth of the matter as rapidly
as possible, relying on traditional safeguards such as cross-examination to test the
qualifications of the witness and the basis for his opinion.
PAUL T. 'LYON
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